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HOW TWO-TIER BOARDS CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVE 
 
ABSTRACT 
Purpose: This study explores how non-executive directors address governance problems on 
Dutch two-tier boards. Within this board model, challenges might be particularly difficult to 
address due to the formal separation of management boards’ decision-management from 
supervisory boards’ decision-control roles. 
 
Design/methodology/approach: Semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire among non-
executive directors provide unique insights into three major challenges in the boardrooms of 
two-tier boards in the Netherlands. 
 
Findings: The study indicates that non-executive directors mainly experience challenges in 
three areas: the ability to ask management critical questions, information asymmetries 
between the management and supervisory boards and the management of the relationship 
between individual executive and non-executive directors. The qualitative in-depth analysis 
reveals the complexity of the contributing factors to problems in the boardroom and the range 
of process and social interventions non-executive directors use to address boardroom issues 
with management and the organization of the board. 
 
Practical implications: While policy makers have been largely occupied with the ‘right’ 
board composition, the results highlight the importance of adequately addressing operational 
challenges in the boardroom. The results emphasize the importance of a better understanding 
of board processes and the need of non-executive directors to carefully manage relationships 
in and around the boardroom.  
 
Originality/value: Whereas most studies have focussed on regulatory initiatives to improve 
the functioning of boards (e.g., the independence of the board), this study explores how non-
executive directors attempt to enhance the effectiveness of boards on which they serve.  
 
Key words: boardroom challenges, board independence, non-executive directors, boardroom 
dynamics, boardroom interventions, two-tier boards, the Netherlands.  
2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Boards of directors play an important role in the governance of companies. By having the 
authority to remove executive directors, set CEO compensation and ratify major strategic 
decisions and financial statements, the board is a key internal mechanism to monitor and 
discipline management (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Johnson et al., 1996; Neville, 2011; 
Oba et al., 2010). The board of directors is deemed necessary as the separation of corporate 
control from corporate ownership potentially gives executive directors leeway to pursue their 
own interests at the expense of the owners of public corporations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Lan and 
Heracleous, 2010; Muth and Donaldson, 1998). 
 However, the global financial crisis and well-known international scandals such as 
Ahold, Enron, Parmalat and WorldCom have highlighted that even reputable boards may 
struggle to effectively monitor executive directors. The causes of failed supervision range 
from critical information asymmetries on boards to the inability of non-executive directors to 
monitor powerful CEOs. Consequently, regulators and practitioners have promoted board 
independence in corporate governance codes and corporate legislation as a means to improve 
board control (Cormier et al. 2010; Daily et al., 2003; Finegold et al., 2007; Zattoni and 
Cuomo, 2010). Typical measures include discouraging CEO-chair duality, increasing the 
outsider ratio, and establishing board monitoring committees (Bezemer et al., 2007; Westphal 
and Zajac, 1997).  
 While the effectiveness of board independence measures has been documented 
extensively in the literature, surprisingly little is known about the internal processes by which 
boards, and in particular non-executive directors, attempt to improve the monitoring potential 
of their boards. Prior research has shown the role and importance of regular boardroom 
evaluations in approving the effectiveness of boards of directors (Conger et al., 1998; Long, 
2006; Minichilli et al., 2007). There is scant evidence, however, about the interventions non-
executive directors use to actually solve emerging issues in the boardroom. For example, how 
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do non-executive directors manage problems in the working relationship with executive 
directors? How do non-executive board members solve issues related to the flow of critical 
information from management to the board? And, how do non-executive directors ensure that 
management is sufficiently challenged during meetings? 
 This qualitative study explores these questions by investigating how non-executive 
directors on Dutch supervisory boards address key challenges in the boardroom. The study 
seeks to contribute to the literature in two ways. First, this research highlights that non-
executive directors frequently experience challenges effectively asking management critical 
questions, information asymmetries and interpersonal working relationships with executive 
directors. An in-depth analysis of non-executive directors' interventions to address these three 
challenges can be categorized as: (i) process interventions by non-executive directors such as 
establishing information protocols or more regularly putting items on the agenda of the board 
of directors and (ii) social interventions by non-executive directors such as challenging a 
culture that does not allow non-executive directors to ask management critical questions and 
by building trust in the working relationships with executives directors. The findings 
highlight the variety and complexity of board room challenges and non-executive directors' 
interventions addressing these challenges. 
 Second, by investigating boardroom challenges and interventions of non-executive 
directors in the Netherlands, the study provides a better understanding of the two-tier board 
model's monitoring potential. Examining boardroom challenges in this context seems 
particularly relevant as the separation of executive directors (i.e., the management board) 
from non-executive directors (i.e., the supervisory board) may complicate the interaction 
between executive and non-executive directors. The study's results indicate that non-
executive directors indeed face several challenges that appear to be typical of the two-tier 
board model. Despite these challenges, non-executive directors emphasize in this study that 
they remain sceptical about the one-tier board’s potential to solve boardroom issues 
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associated with two-tier boards, suggesting that the origins of many boardroom challenges go 
beyond the choice of a certain board model to govern executive directors. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two provides an overview 
of prior research on one-tier and two-tier boards. Section three describes the corporate 
governance context in the Netherlands, discusses the two-stage research design and details 
the study's data gathering process. Section four describes the three main challenges non-
executive directors experience in the boardroom and pays particular attention to how non-
executive directors address these issues. Section five discusses the empirical findings and 
their theoretical and practical implications. 
 
ONE-TIER AND TWO-TIER BOARDS 
Boards of directors operate in a variety of systems to monitor management. Whereas non-
executive directors in the United States, United Kingdom and Japan operate in one-tier 
boards, non-executive directors in Germany, the Netherlands, China and Indonesia supervise 
executive directors in two-tier boards (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). Other countries such as 
Russia provide non-executive directors the opportunity to monitor management using hybrid 
board models, combining key characteristics of one-tier and two-tier boards. While one-tier 
boards integrate decision-management and decision-control in one organizational body, two-
tier boards provide for a formal separation of both roles. In two-tier boards, executive 
directors (i.e., the management board) are responsible for the daily operations of the company 
and non-executive directors (i.e., the supervisory board) are responsible for the supervision of 
executive directors (Jungmann, 2006; Maassen, 1999; Millet-Reyers and Zhao, 2010). 
 Scholars have debated the comparative strengths and weaknesses of one-tier and two-
tier boards. In essence, the main underlying difference between board models relates to the 
central question whether it is desirable to have independent monitors involved in decision-
management. With fewer organizational layers, the one-tier model may create fewer 
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information asymmetries and alleviate bureaucratic hurdles that may hamper the decision-
making process of non-executive directors on two-tier boards (Hooghiemstra and Van 
Manen, 2004; Jungmann, 2006; Maassen, 1999). On the other hand, the structure of one-tier 
boards in which executive and non-executive directors operate on one board may jeopardize 
the board’s ability to monitor executive directors and provide independent advice to 
management. Moreover, insider dominated boards might miss business opportunities, as 
independent outsiders may offer alternative views on environmental developments (Jungmann, 
2006; Millet-Reyers and Zhao, 2010). Accordingly, proponents of the two-tier board model 
have emphasized the advantages of having non-executives involved in decision-control only. 
 Scholars and practitioners have not reached consensus on the monitoring potential of 
the board models (see for example Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Jungmann, 2006; Millet-
Reyers and Zhao, 2010; Rose, 2005). Major corporate governance scandals have occurred in 
firms using one-tier and two-tier boards. Moreover, the literature suggests that boardroom 
problems exist in both board models, ranging from information asymmetries and dominant 
CEOs to group decision-making and other issues related to group dynamics (e.g., Conger and 
Lawler, 2009; Hooghiemstra and Van Manen, 2004; Maassen and Van den Bosch, 1999; 
Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). In this regard, Conger et al. (1998:140) remark that all boards 
need “knowledge, information, power, motivation and time” to adequately execute their roles. 
 Whereas the literature suggests that non-executive directors on one-tier and two-tier 
boards may face multiple boardroom challenges, the separation of decision-management 
from decision-control in the two-tier board model may generate additional obstacles to non-
executive directors to monitor management. Fewer joint meetings between executive and 
non-executive directors of two-tier boards compared to one-tier boards (Spencer Stuart, 2013) 
may make it more difficult for directors to build trust relationships, thereby potentially 
undermining the communication and flows of information between both boards. Furthermore, 
the absence of insider information may make it more difficult for non-executive directors on 
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a supervisory board to fully understand and ratify strategic initiatives of the management 
board, thereby possibly frustrating decision-making processes. In addition, the distance of 
supervisory board members from the decision- making processes may make it more difficult 
for non-executive directors to provide resources to the firm, thereby missing value-creation 
opportunities. With this in mind, the study explores boardroom challenges in the context of 
the Dutch two-tier board model. Specifically, the following three research questions are 
explored qualitatively: 
 
1. What are the main boardroom challenges non-executive directors face on two-tier boards? 
2. What are the factors contributing to the main boardroom challenges of non-executive 
directors on two-tier boards? 
3. How do non-executive directors attempt to address boardroom challenges on two-tier 
boards? 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Research Context 
For decades it has been common for corporations in the Dutch governance system to operate 
a supervisory board, consisting solely of non-executive directors, next to a management 
board, consisting solely of executive directors. This structure is mandated by corporate law to 
balance the interests of stakeholders in the public corporation by formally separating 
decision-management from decision-control (Hooghiemstra and Van Manen, 2004; Maassen 
and Van Den Bosch, 1999). In the Dutch corporate governance code (2008:19), the role of the 
supervisory board is defined as follows: “to supervise the policies of the management board 
and the general affairs of the company and its affiliated enterprise, as well as to assist the 
management board by providing advice.” The role of the management board is “to manage 
the company, which means, among other things, that it is responsible for achieving the 
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company’s aims, the strategy and associated risk profile, the development of results and 
corporate social responsibility issues that are relevant to the enterprise. The management 
board is accountable for this to the supervisory board and to the general meeting.” (Dutch 
corporate governance code, 2008:11). 
Recently, the growing influence of foreign investors, the introduction of corporate 
governance (self-)regulatory initiatives in response to global scandals and heightened societal 
expectations have changed the work of supervisory boards and expectations of the 
effectiveness of two-tier boards in the Netherlands. In particular, the workload of non-
executive directors on supervisory boards has increased as a result of the growing complexity 
of firms and their environments and the increased focus on compliance and control challenge 
the effectiveness of traditional two-tier boards (see Akkermans et al., 2007; Bezemer et al., 
2012; De Jong et al. 2005; 2010; Hooghiemstra, 2012; Spencer Stuart, 2013; Van Ees et al., 
2003 for more detailed descriptions of the Dutch corporate governance model).  
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
Given the dearth of research studies on director dynamics and boardroom challenges (Pye 
and Pettigrew, 2005; Pugliese et al., 2009; Van Ees et al., 2009), this study uses a qualitative 
approach. Qualitative techniques are particularly useful in exploring new phenomena, new 
variables and the boundaries of existing assumptions (Bansal, 2013; McNulty et al. 2013). 
The study uses multiple techniques during our observation period (2007-2012) to triangulate 
our data (Jick, 1979) and obtain a broad and comprehensive overview of challenges in the 
boardrooms of two-tier boards in the Netherlands. In broad terms, the study applies a two-
stage approach (see figure 1). During the first stage, the research team analysed eleven self-
assessment reports of supervisory boards to create a list of boardroom challenges and 
subsequently used semi-structured interviews and a web-based questionnaire to identify the 
boardroom challenges that scored high on importance and occurrence. The self-assessments 
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were conducted by a Dutch training institute for directors between 2007-2009 and the web-
based questionnaire was sent to 143 alumni of the directors' training institute mid-2010. A 
detailed description and analysis of the empirical findings can be found in Peij et al. (2012). 
During the second stage of this research, the top-3 boardroom challenges were 
examined in more detail to understand the causes of these challenges and how non-executive 
directors respond to these challenges. For that purpose, the research team interviewed seven of 
the 2010-questionnaire participants during one to two-hour sessions (see Appendix A for a 
sample of interview questions) and used non-executive directors' observations to develop a 
refined questionnaire. As interviewees highlighted the complexities and context-specificities 
surrounding boardroom challenges, the research team included two open-ended questions in 
the questionnaire to allow non-executive directors to describe their boardroom experiences. 
More specifically, the questions “which board intervention would you use to address 
boardroom challenge X” and “what would be an example of an effective board intervention 
that you have applied in the past to address boardroom challenge X” were used to survey 
non-executive directors about boardroom interventions (see Appendix A for a sample of our 
survey questions). 
 During March 2012, a second web-based questionnaire was sent to 1,102 alumni and 
contacts of the training institute for directors. In total, 91 non-executive directors with 
experience on two-tier boards filled out the survey, yielding a response rate of 8.3%. As some 
participants skipped the open-ended questions, the research team obtained 162 responses for 
the first open-ended question (i.e., what boardroom interventions would you use) for the three 
boardroom problems combined. For the second open-ended question (i.e., what effective 
boardroom interventions did you use in the past), the research team obtained 92 replies. 
Furthermore, the length of the provided narratives varied from 1 to 82 words per open-ended 
question, with an average of 19 words. 
 Following Van Maanen’s (1979) approach to analyse qualitative data, the research 
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team used open coding techniques to assign first-order concepts or descriptive phrases to the 
254 narratives collected via the survey (Strauss and Corbin 1990). These first-order concepts 
allowed the research team to construct an overview of how participating non-executive 
directors perceived and defined boardroom challenges and interventions. As part of the 
review, directors' narratives were discussed several times to group similar descriptions in 
order to create categories of frequently mentioned interventions for each challenge. Given the 
diversity of mentioned boardroom challenges, some directors' answers required multiple 
iterations in order to correctly classify responses. Finally, the empirical findings of the study 
were presented at directors' events to obtain additional feedback. 
 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
RESULTS 
The eleven self-assessment reports and the 2010-questionnaire indicated that non-executive 
directors on Dutch supervisory boards are confronted with significant boardroom challenges. 
Whereas most challenges scored high on either importance (e.g., issues regarding integrity 
and the chair’s functioning) or frequency of occurrence (e.g., issues regarding meeting 
effectiveness and board composition), three boardroom challenges scored relatively high on 
both dimensions: (i) issues regarding the ability of non-executive directors to ask management 
critical questions (importance: 4.6 out of 5.0; occurrence: 82% of the non-executive directors 
experienced this); (ii) issues regarding information asymmetries in the boardroom (impor-
tance: 4.4; occurrence: 47%) and (iii) issues regarding the interpersonal working relationship 
between executive and non-executive directors (importance: 4.3; occurrence: 68%).1 
 Given the significance of these three boardroom challenges, a second survey instru-
ment explored how supervisory boards address issues in these areas. The 91 non-executive 
                                                          
1 See Peij et al. (2012) for a more detailed list of all identified boardroom challenges and scores on respectively 
importance and occurrence. 
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directors that filled-out the questionnaire in 2012 are experienced board members: 72.5% of 
them have been on supervisory boards for five years or longer and 57.1% of them currently 
hold 2 or more directorships. Their board positions vary from directorships in listed companies 
to positions in SMEs and nonprofit-organizations. Approximately 78% of the respondents 
were male. The narratives provided by the non-executive directors confirm the significance 
of the challenges. The following sections explore each main boardroom challenge in detail. 
 
Boardroom Challenge 1 - Ability of Non-Executives to Ask Managers Critical Questions 
One of the key areas in which supervisory board members experience challenges is the ability 
of non-executive directors to ask managers critical questions. A non-executive director, for 
example, describes that “in the past, the board’s non-questioning behaviour has created 
problems; I still remember an integrity breach that we did not handle well. We have learned 
from it and we have become much more vigilant.” 
 Non-executive directors mention various causes inhibiting their ability to ask managers 
critical questions. First, they often describe that they struggle with defensive behaviours of 
executive directors. One non-executive director believes that “the executive directors find it 
troublesome and pointless that we ask questions.” Another supervisory board member 
describes that “answering questions sometimes leads to excessive information supply from the 
part of management. (...) This can of course be completely sincere, but sometimes it looks a 
bit like a tactic to overwhelm the board.” In this context, several non-executive directors 
mention that it is sometimes culturally undesirable to question issues too often in the 
boardroom. For example, a supervisory board member states that “the Dutch don’t like it 
when people lose face. But that leaves space for people that don’t want to follow the rules 
very precisely.” Two other non-executive directors indicate that “not asking questions has to 
do with social pressure. You want to have a good time” and “it sometimes happens that fellow 
supervisory board members find it unpleasant when you keep asking questions.” In sum, the 
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presence of a culture that does not allow non-executive directors to ask management critical 
questions appears to undermine non-executive directors' supervisory roles and the 
supervisory board's monitoring potential. 
 Second, supervisory board members also hinted at the inability of the board to 
challenge management: “The questioning skills of fellow directors are sometimes quite poor.” 
However, more often non-executive directors mentioned the inability of board members to 
support each other’s questioning. Comments like “there is too little support within the 
supervisory board" and "questions are often posed by individual directors, not by the board 
as a group” were regularly made. A non-executive director describes that he always “figures 
out in advance whether there is support within the supervisory board, because questioning 
can lead to awkward situations during board meetings.” 
 Third, non-executive directors also highlighted that not having access to the “right” 
information is a barrier to asking critical questions. In some cases, non-executive directors 
ascribe this to the literal absence of data about key developments. Non-executive directors, 
however, most often struggle with information overload. A supervisory board member states 
that “the board should first identify the most relevant issues together with the executive board, 
and consequently discuss those issues during the meetings.” Another non-executive director 
highlights this aspect from a different angle: “I think as a board, we need to be clearer about 
our information needs in order to ask the right questions as part of the process.” In sum, the 
lack or the abundance of information may undermine non-executive directors' ability to ask 
management critical questions. 
 
Addressing Boardroom Challenge 1 
Non-executive directors mention a wide range of interventions to manage problems in this 
area, varying from simple to complex, structural to behavioural and incidental to repetitive. 
Many non-executive directors state that it is important to address a culture that does not allow 
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non-executive directors to ask management critical questions by creating a boardroom 
atmosphere in which executive and non-executive directors can have open and frank 
discussions. A non-executive director mentions that “you have to create a safe environment 
in which you can discuss things openly and people don’t make sarcastic remarks.” 
Depending on the situation, non-executive directors highlight that this can be achieved by 
persistently asking management the right questions and (ii) asking similar questions in 
different ways. A non-executive director, for example, describes that “if you do not 
understand something, you should just ask questions. If you still do not understand it 
afterwards, you should become suspicious. A board cannot make decisions that you don’t 
understand.” Others mention that one should “just keep asking questions; if necessary by 
making a joke or downplaying the importance of the issue” and that it is important to “remain 
in a questioning mode and refrain from expressing your personal opinions.”  
 Non-executive directors also refer to the importance of managing relationships with 
management: “It is important that management trusts the supervisory board and that the 
boardroom is a safe environment. They must know that it’s all about the content, not 
personal.” This can be done by preparing management for critical questions. Non-executive 
directors explain that they usually ask more difficult questions before meetings: “It works 
well when you ask your questions before the meeting as executive directors will not be taken 
by surprise.” Non-executive directors emphasize the important role of the chair of the super-
visory board: “The relationship between both chairs [of the management and the supervisory 
boards] and their efforts to discuss matters beforehand is crucial in this area.”  
 Non-executive directors also refer to a number of solutions relating to the 
organization of the board’s work. Several non-executive directors, for example, suggest that 
streamlining the decision-making processes in the boardroom improved their ability to ask 
management questions. Specifically, putting critical issues on the meeting agenda at a regular 
basis prepared management for the supervisory board’s inquiries. A non-executive director 
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elaborates on this: “Develop as a board an annual plan in which you highlight key themes 
and ways to monitor them. As a result, the management team knows that these issues will be 
critically discussed.” Organizing meetings outside regularly scheduled board meetings is also 
mentioned by non-executive directors as a means to adequately ask management critical 
questions. For instance, a non-executive director described that “it is sometimes useful to 
address tough questions in a special focus meeting.” Another non-executive director points 
out that this may particularly be important as “time pressure and urgency are sometimes 
misused by executive directors. In those cases, it is important to remain vigilant and make 
sure the board is not carried away by the situation.” 
 Moreover, several non-executive directors highlight the need to profoundly understand 
the organization and its challenges. A supervisory board member describes: “Make sure that 
you know what you are talking about. As a board member, you should collect information 
separately from management and understand the key elements of the organization.” Some 
non-executive directors actually described how they obtained additional information: “Before 
the board meeting, I always walk through the organization and talk with people. Particularly 
when there are certain issues, I make sure that I speak with involved key personnel.” In sum, 
assuring that one really understands the business is seen by non-executive directors as a 
critical factor for preparing and enabling the board to ask management critical questions as 
part of the board's decision control role. 
 
Boardroom Challenge 2 – Information Asymmetries 
A second major area in which supervisory board members experience challenges relates to 
the quantity, quality, timing and focus of information provided by management. First, non-
executive directors' narratives often illustrate their discontent with the quantity of information. 
Sometimes this relates to the absence of relevant information, yet most often information 
overload appears to be the core problem. For example, a non-executive board member 
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explains that “complicated matters often involve an overload of information. In those cases, a 
clear summary of the key issues would have been more effective.” A non-executive director 
summarizes this by pointing out that “executive directors sometimes seem to have an ‘I-had-
no-time-to-write-a-shorter-letter-attitude’.” 
 Second, non-executive directors regularly refer to lacking organizational capabilities 
to collect and analyse required information. Two supervisory board members, for instance, 
note that “the (financial) systems are not sufficient and the organizational culture is not well-
attuned to analyse critical information about environmental developments” and “the way in 
which financial information is being presented to the board is lacking clarity.” Non-
executive directors also experience issues relating to the timing of information, as pointed out 
by the following quote: “The timing of information is sometimes a problem within the board. 
In some cases, managers already have made decisions and as a result the supervisory board 
receives the information when everything is already done and the dust has settled.” 
 Third, non-executive directors also indicate that the information provided by managers 
to the supervisory board focuses too narrowly on particular issues. Specifically, non-executive 
directors often state that financial information dominates boardroom discussions. One non-
executive director describes this as follows: “In our meetings, there tends to be too much focus 
on the numbers. However, these figures in the end say nothing about the actual development 
of the business.” Several non-executive directors emphasize the need to receive more 
information other than financial statements and state that: “Early warning signals are more 
present in sales forecasts and service level, quality and client satisfaction trends.” In sum, 
receiving the right quantity and quality of information, at the right time, is a challenge to 
many non-executive directors on Dutch supervisory boards.  
 
Addressing Boardroom Challenge 2 
Non-executive directors refer to a range of boardroom interventions to address information 
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asymmetries. A group of non-executive directors highlights the importance of establishing a 
formal information protocol, outlining detailed information requirements of the supervisory 
board. Several non-executive directors indicate that drafting this protocol is a balancing act 
between obtaining all the required information and keeping the amount of information 
manageable. One non-executive director illustrates this by describing that “you need a good 
information protocol that makes explicit which information should be provided to the board. 
But it is important to keep in mind that there is information that is ‘must have’ and 
information that is ‘nice to have’.” Non-executive directors highlight that an information 
protocol not only structures the provision of information, but that it also helps to manage 
mutual expectations. One non-executive director describes this in the following way: “It is 
very useful when managers make a yearly information plan for the board that clarifies which 
information can be expected at certain points in time.” 
 Non-executive directors also often mention that information sharing is a continuous 
process as a board’s information requirements change over time. One of the supervisory 
board members states that this process is about “striking the right balance. You continuously 
have to assess the quality and quantity of information to make sure everything is well-
functioning. We regularly do this as a board.” Non-executive directors regularly mention that 
their supervisory boards make small structural changes to the information protocol. To keep 
the amount of information manageable, for example, supervisory boards have started to 
include executive summaries in board papers. As highlighted by a supervisory board 
member: “Keep asking for the information you think is necessary, but don’t fail to flag 
information that is no longer required. Also include an executive summary containing the 
main issues.” Another non-executive director describes how the board, together with 
management, filtered out details to make the provided information more succinct: “My 
observation was that the provided information contained too many details. We discussed it 
with the CEO and controller and reduced the level of detail of the reported information.” 
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 A number of non-executive directors believe that maintaining a healthy working 
relationship with management is key to obtaining essential information quickly and correctly. 
One supervisory board member describes this in the following way: “You have to work hard 
on establishing trust in relationships as this will guarantee that everything of absolute 
importance will be openly discussed in the board meeting.” Non-executive directors mention 
that establishing relationships beyond management also facilitates the exchange of infor-
mation: “I always make sure that I go to places where people will freely talk about the 
company. By carefully listening to customers, I obtain a good view on what’s going on. 
Sometimes you get the impression that they are talking about a different organization.” As 
such, broadening the number of information sources appears to be an important tool for non-
executive directors to manage information requirements of the supervisory board. 
 
Boardroom Challenge 3 – Interpersonal Tensions in Board-Management Relationships 
Non-executive directors' narratives indicate the existence of additional issues, ranging from 
interpersonal conflicts to strong disagreement with management with regard to the future 
direction of the firm. Although it is clear from the non-executive directors' responses that 
tensions often arose during times of change and financial distress, non-executive directors 
were in general less explicit about these issues and have difficulties pinpointing the exact 
causes of problems in this area. However, two factors clearly stand out. First, non-executive 
directors struggle to manage formal responsibilities as a director with personal relationships 
they may have with executive directors of the firm. One non-executive director describes: 
“My biggest challenge is to strike the right balance between my formal role as director and 
my wish to maintain a healthy relationship with management.” Another supervisory board 
member concurs by stating that “friendship should never affect the execution of your role as a 
supervisory board member.” As stated by one supervisory board member, the tensions can 
have significant implications: “If friendships imply that you cannot ask questions anymore, 
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there is definitely a good reason to leave a supervisory board (as long as you assume that 
friendship is important to you).” 
 Second, non-executive directors also frequently describe the absence of trust in the 
working relationships with executive directors as a challenge to establishing and maintaining 
working relationships between the supervisory board and the management board. On the one 
hand this is caused by the impression that management is not open enough about ongoing 
matters. A non-executive director expresses his frustration by noting that “management tends 
to keep the supervisory board at a distance. Consequently we don’t know enough to execute 
our roles adequately.” Similarly, another non-executive director observes that “a main 
obstacle in my relationship with management is the extent to which information is censored 
and edited by executive directors.” Non-executive directors also mention that mistrust arises 
from the appointment and/or election of executive and non-executive directors who are not 
up to their task. For example, a supervisory board member states that in his experience: 
“Challenges in the relationship between supervisory board members and executive directors 
often arise as a result of the [low] quality of incoming non-executive directors.” Similarly, 
another non-executive director refers to a lack of skills on the management board: “In my 
view, the CEO should be able to do way more to improve the quality of decision-making and 
usefulness of documents presented to the board.” Thus, both the absence of trust and presence 
of friendship are mentioned as key factors contributing to challenges in the working relation-
ship between executive and non-executive directors on Dutch two-tier boards. 
 
Addressing Boardroom Challenge 3 
Many non-executive directors in this study refer to one single intervention to manage 
possible issues in board-management relationships, i.e., putting effort into developing the 
relationship by constantly communicating with management while keeping an appropriate 
distance. The largest group of non-executive directors describe that one simply has to openly 
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address issues as soon as they arise in the relationship. Two supervisory board members 
describe this in the following way: “You have to be open, transparent and honest; you have 
to be willing to confront each other when there are problems in the relation” and “one should 
simply pinpoint things when there is something wrong, of course always with the utmost 
respect for individuals.” Non-executive directors also highlight several times that the chair of 
the supervisory board plays a central role in addressing any relational challenges: “I think 
problems in the working relationship and related tensions should at first be discussed in 
private by the chair. It is from there that you can work on a solution.” 
 Non-executive directors also mentioned the importance of communicating mutual role 
expectations with executive directors. By clarifying each other’s operating domains and 
responsibilities, possible relational tensions can be partially prevented. One non-executive 
director notes: “it is important to be clear about what both boards expect from each other. 
And you have to respect those mutual expectations and use them as a starting point to search 
for win-win solutions.” Non-executive directors also point out that regularly evaluating and 
reviewing these mutual expectations is essential. One supervisory board member states: “You 
should explicate the roles and responsibilities of executive and non-executive directors and 
evaluate these every year and identify opportunities for improvement. The working relation 
can always be improved, even if it is good already.” Hence, non-executive directors indicate 
that explicating and monitoring expectations is central to resolving  interpersonal tensions in 
board-management relationships. 
 Non-executive directors also refer to the necessity of taking sufficient time "to get to 
know each other" and better understand what drives executive and non-executive directors. A 
non-executive director describes the importance of this process: “You have to put a lot of 
energy in building a healthy relationship, of course within the boundaries of your role. You 
have to make clear that both boards are on the same side, that they are not opponents.” 
Another non-executive director observes: “It is important to speak with each other on a 
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personal level; you have to explain what you want and how one should interpret your 
comments.” Non-executive directors also indicate that informal occasions may be good 
opportunities to strengthen relations with executive directors, ranging from company visits 
and committee meetings to golf and dinners. One supervisory board member describes that 
one should try to “do something together regularly. For example, as a board, we assisted a 
project start-up in country X after a natural disaster and it is a great operational success. 
This helps to strengthen relationships.” To conclude, figure 2 provides an overview of the 
most frequently indicated causes of challenges in the boardroom and associated interventions.  
 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
DISCUSSION 
This study explores three main challenges of non-executive directors on Dutch supervisory 
boards: (i) the ability of non-executive directors to ask management critical questions, (ii) 
information asymmetries between executive and non-executive directors and their boards and 
(iii) interpersonal tensions in the relationship between the management and supervisory 
boards. Semi-structured interviews, surveys and non-executive directors' narratives indicate a 
diversity of problems in and around the boardroom as well as remedies adopted by non-
executive directors to address these problems. The results of the study highlight that structural 
and behavioural factors contribute to problems in all three areas. Moreover, the empirical 
findings suggest that the formal separation of decision-management from decision-control in 
the two-tier model may create additional challenges related to the working relationships of 
the management and supervisory boards. 
 The findings have several implications for scholars and practitioners. First, the analysis 
highlights the complexities involved in assessing and addressing challenges in the boardroom. 
20 
 
Structural and behavioural factors contribute to non-executive directors' ability to ask 
management critical questions and address information asymmetries and relational tensions 
between the management and supervisory boards. Particularly, social interventions, such as 
challenging a culture that does not allow non-executive directors to ask management critical 
questions and building trust in relationships with executive directors, are perceived by non-
executive directors to be much more difficult than process interventions, such as establishing 
information protocols or more regularly placing items on the agenda of the supervisory board. 
Interestingly, the social interventions, such as having more informal contact with managers, 
were often criticized for jeopardizing the independence of the supervisory board. Therefore, 
carefully managing and regularly evaluating the rather complex behavioural dynamics within 
and between supervisory and management boards seems particularly relevant to assure the 
effective execution of a board’s monitoring function. 
 Second, (self-)regulatory corporate governance reform initiatives have focused on 
organizational measures to improve the monitoring potential of boards of directors, such as 
increasing the outsider ratio on corporate boards of directors, discouraging CEO-chair duality 
and establishing monitoring committees of boards of directors. While these externally-driven 
measures may improve the perceived independence of boards of directors, the findings of the 
study highlight the importance of internally-driven initiatives to improve the monitoring 
potential of boards of directors (Conger et al., 1998; Long, 2006; Minichilli et al., 2007). In 
this study, non-executive directors often emphasize that the chair of the supervisory board 
particularly plays an essential role by (i) managing the relationship with the CEO, (ii) 
structuring work processes in and around the boardroom and (iii) pro-actively keeping track 
of problematic issues (see Kakabadse et al. 2006; Kakabadse and Kakabadse 2007a, 2007b; 
Roberts 2002; Roberts and Stiles 1999 for research that supports these findings). 
Third, the narratives provided by non-executive directors suggest that supervisory 
board members experience challenges as a result of the separation of decision-management 
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from decision-control in the Dutch board system. In that context, the recent introduction of 
the one-tier board in Dutch Company Law might offer an attractive alternative to boards in 
the Netherlands. Interestingly, 78.7% of the participating non-executive directors do not 
believe that the one-tier board model is able to offer a solution to boardroom challenges. 
Respondents typically state that “people will not change”, “the boardroom culture is more 
important than the structure” and “it is all about the persons operating a board model.” 
Instead, respondents often highlighted that they were afraid that the introduction of the one-
tier board might jeopardize the highly-valued independent position of non-executive directors. 
Consequently, additional research on the comparative (dis)advantages of one-tier and two-tier 
board models within the same institutional context may shed more light on the importance of 
board structure vice versa actual board behaviour (cf. Millet-Reyers and Zhao, 2010). 
 This exploratory study has a number of limitations that provide avenues for future 
research. First, whereas the study has provided an overview of factors contributing to board-
room challenges and associated interventions by non-executive directors, the methodology 
did not allow for a differentiation between the relative importance of causes of the boardroom 
challenges and interventions by non-executive directors. As a result, the significance of certain 
causes and interventions might be over- or underrepresented in the study. Larger-scale studies 
could more structurally compare and contrasts specific causes and interventions to establish 
their relative impact on a board’s monitoring potential. 
 Second, participating non-executive directors and their supervisory boards have been 
treated equally in this study, thereby ignoring important differences that may exist between 
individual non-executive directors and supervisory boards. Additional research could explore 
individual-level contingencies (such as director status, experience, power, age and educational 
background), board-level contingencies (such as board size, board diversity) and firm-level 
contingencies (such as organizational size and operating context) to better understand how 
these factor affect the importance of factors contributing to boardroom challenges (see for 
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example Yildirim-Oktem and Usdiken, 2010; Zona et al., forthcoming).  
 Third, whereas the Dutch context is a good starting point to examine boardroom 
challenges of non-executive directors on two-tier boards, the empirical findings may be 
contingent on this specific setting. It may be worthwhile to replicate this study in other 
countries with two-tier boards, such as China, Denmark, Germany, Indonesia and Taiwan. 
Countries with mixed and hybrid board models, such as Bulgaria, Finland, France, Russia 
and Switzerland (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Millet-Reyers and Zhao, 2010), also offer 
interesting research settings to further compare and contrast boardroom challenges. 
 Fourth, given well-known difficulties of researchers to gain access to board members, 
the various stages of this study heavily relied upon convenience sampling (i.e., alumni and 
contacts of one training institute for directors). Consequently, the findings may be biased as 
the sample consists of supervisory board members who for various reasons have expressed an 
interest in director courses. Therefore, more research at a larger scale is necessary to confirm 
the observed boardroom patterns.  Moreover, as the results in this study heavily rely on the 
self-perceptions of non-executive directors, it might also be interesting to extent this research 
by examining how managers view their relationship with supervisory board members. 
 The results of the study reveal the complexities involved in assessing and addressing 
boardroom challenges of non-executive directors in the Dutch two-tier context. Structural and 
behavioural factors contribute to the ability of non-executive directors to ask management 
critical questions, address information asymmetries and manage the working relationship 
between the management and supervisory boards. Non-executive directors described a wide 
range of interventions to manage possible problems in these areas. These observations 
provide corporate governance scholars the opportunity to further examine board processes to 
gain a better understanding of the factors contributing to non-executive directors' boardroom 
challenges and the opportunity to improve the monitoring potential of boards of directors.  
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Figure 1: Two-Stage Research Design Used to Explore Boardroom Challenges  
 
Timing Data Type Detail Rationale 
Stage 1 
(2010) 
Self-assessment 
reports 
Review of 11 detailed self-
assessment reports of supervisory 
boards in the Netherlands. 
Used to obtain an overview 
of problem areas that boards 
perceive as challenging; a 
content analysis highlighted 
17 problem areas. 
2010-Survey 
143 former and current supervisory 
board members were asked to 
complete a survey and rate the 
importance and occurrence of 
issues in the 17 detected problem 
areas; 24% of the targeted non-
executive directors participated in 
the study. 
Used to identify the most 
critical boardroom 
challenges (i.e., having 
relatively high scores on 
both importance and 
occurrence).  
Semi-structured 
interviews 
5 semi-structured interviews with 
high-profile non-executive directors 
of listed firms in the Netherlands. 
Used to confirm the survey 
results and to obtain an 
expert opinion on how the 
effectiveness of supervisory 
boards could be improved in 
the most critical boardroom 
areas.  
Stage 2 
(2012) 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
7 semi-structured interviews with 
non-executive directors of various 
types of organizations (1-2 hours 
each). 
Used to develop a second, 
more elaborate survey to 
explore the main three 
boardroom challenges as 
identified in the 2010-
survey. 
2012-Survey 
1,102 supervisory board members 
were asked to fill-out a survey 
exploring the three most critical 
boardroom challenges; six open-
ended questions were used to 
obtain director narratives; 8.3% of 
the targeted non-executive directors 
participated in the study. 
Used to obtain in-depth 
insights in the factors 
contributing to boardroom 
challenges as well as the 
intervention techniques used 
by non-executive directors 
to prevent and address 
issues in these areas. 
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Figure 2: Main Interventions and Contributing Factors to Boardroom Challenges in the Dutch Two-Tier Model 
 
 
      Contributing Factors                  Boardroom Challenges                 Board Interventions 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Boardroom Challenge 1: 
Asking Management Questions 
Boardroom Challenge 2: 
Information Asymmetries 
Boardroom Challenge 3: 
Board-Management Relationships 
* Defensive behaviour management 
* Non-questioning boardroom culture 
* Lacking director abilities 
* Lacking group support 
* Lacking in-depth information 
* Quantity of information is inadequate or 
a too narrow focus on certain issues 
* Lacking organizational capabilities to 
collect the right information 
* Wrong timing of information  
* Balancing formal responsibilities with 
personal relationships 
* Lack of openness in the relationship 
between executives and non-executives 
* Quality of executive and non-executive 
directors too low 
 
* Questioning perseverance 
* Preparing management for questions 
* Investing in the relation with executives 
* Structuring the questioning process 
* Solidly understanding the business 
* Establishing an information protocol 
* Regularly evaluating the information 
requirements (together with executives) 
* Working on the relation with executives 
* Using multiple information sources 
 
* Directly addressing issues in the relation 
* Strengthening the CEO-chair relation 
* Assigning an effective chairperson 
* Communicating and evaluating mutual 
expectations 
* Spending time together (in)formally 
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Appendix A: Sample of Interview and Survey Questions 
 
Interview Questions 
 
- Our consultancy work in the boardroom has indicated that boards can face issues relating to 
the ability of non-executive directors to challenge executive directors during and after board 
meetings, and issues relating to the question when (not) to continue probing, particularly in 
cases where answers of the executive directors are incomplete or not satisfactory.  
- Have you experienced any challenges in this area? 
- Could you please provide specific examples from your own experience as a director? 
- What are in your view the main causes for problems in this area? 
- What would in your view be a good solution for challenges in this area? 
 
- Our consultancy work in the boardroom has indicated that boards can face issues relating to 
the quality and quantity of information provided by the executive board. 
- Have you experienced any challenges in this area? 
- Could you please provide specific examples from your own experience as a director? 
- What are in your view the main causes for problems in this area? 
- What would in your view be a good solution for challenges in this area? 
 
- Our consultancy work in the boardroom has indicated that boards can face issues relating to 
the behavior and (non-)verbal communication between executive and non-executive directors. 
For example, there can be interpersonal conflicts and clashes between both boards. 
- Have you experienced any challenges in this area? 
- Could you please provide specific examples from your own experience as a director? 
- What are in your view the main causes for problems in this area? 
- What would in your view be a good solution for challenges in this area? 
 
Open-ended Survey Questions 
 
- Which board intervention would you use to address boardroom challenges relating to the 
ability of non-executives to ask managers critical questions? 
- What would be an example of an effective board intervention that you have applied in the 
past to address boardroom challenges relating to the ability of non-executives to ask managers 
critical questions? 
- Which board intervention would you use to address boardroom challenges relating to 
information asymmetries between the management and supervisory boards? 
- What would be an example of an effective board intervention that you have applied in the 
past to address boardroom challenges relating to information asymmetries between the 
management and supervisory boards? 
- Which board intervention would you use to address boardroom challenges relating to the 
relationship between individual executive and non-executive directors? 
- What would be an example of an effective board intervention that you have applied in the 
past to address boardroom challenges relating to the relationship between individual executive 
and non-executive directors? 
 
 
